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A Tale of Two Debt Crises: The IMF, World Bank and the Sustainable Development of
Sub-Saharan Africa
Abstract
Discussions of emerging markets have become ubiquitous in modern business literature. Critical 
analysis of the factors that will lead to the sustainable development of emerging markets, 
however, has focused overwhelmingly on the national business environment. Absent from
discussion has been an exploration of external factors that lead to sustainable development. In 
particular, study of how the sustainable development of emerging markets is conditioned by the
structure of the international business environment has been neglected. This chapter will address 
this issue. Specifically, the chapter will examine the role of external factors on the sustainable 
development of emerging markets through a case study of the impact of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank on Sub-Saharan Africa since 1980. Analysis of the IMF 
and World Bank is important because these institutions have been integral to the radical 
transformation of the structure of the international business environment in the last four decades. 
Introduction
Recent decades has have seen the contemporary literature on global business replete with 
discussion of emerging markets, defined as countries that are ‘in a transition phase from
developing to developed markets due to rapid growth and industrialization’ (Cavusgil, Ghauri & 
Akcal, 2013: 5). This is unsurprising given the rapid growth of emerging markets since the term
was first coined by World Bank economist Antoine Van Agtmael in 1981. Since then countries
that were peripheral to the international business environment in the early 1980s, the lead 
example being China, are now among the most powerful economies in the world. Whilst 






   
 
   
 
   
  
 
   
  
     
  
 
environment, critical analysis of the factors that promote sustainable development has 
overwhelmingly focused on domestic factors related to the national business environment. 
Sustainable development is defined in this chapter as development ‘that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’, the 
same definition adopted by the United Nations (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987)
Absent from the business literature is exploration of how the sustainable development of 
emerging markets is affected by external factors. In particular, how the sustainable development 
of emerging markets is conditioned by the structure of the international business environment
has been neglected. For example, despite the literature making ample use of the economic data 
they produce, with notable exceptions (Kvint, 2010), it is largely bereft of in-depth analysis of 
the role global institutions play in the international business environment. When global 
institutions are mentioned in the business literature on emerging markets discussion tends to 
fixate on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (El-Hadi Arouri, Boubaker & Nguyen, 2011; 
Gamble, 2011; Grosse, 2016; Hadjikauni, Elg & Ghuar, 2012; Poillon, 2001; Rammamurti &
Singh, 2009) 
Critical analysis of the role of global institutions in the international business environment, 
however, is often non-existent and it is necessary to delve into literature on international political 
economy, where the debate is mature, to discern their influence on emerging markets (Santiso, 
2004). For instance, one leading book on Doing Business in Emerging Markets has only two 
references to global institutions, both of which are considered as apolitical and value-free arbiters 
of the international business environment that ‘recommend and enforce a liberalisation of trade, 



















market system is fair and efficient’ (Cavusgil, Ghauri & Akcal, 2013: 18). This is particularly 
neglectful in the case of the IMF and World Bank. These institutions have been central to the 
decades-long, radical transformation of the international business environment in which 
emerging markets have conducted their search for sustainable development.
This chapter will address the absence of external factors from our understanding of sustainable 
development of emerging markets through a case study of the impact of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank on Sub-Saharan Africa since 1980. The chapter will be 
organised in the following manner. It will begin with discussion of the 1980s debt crisis in the 
global economy, which saw the IMF and World Bank take a leading role in the transformation of
the international business environment through the implementation of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ model of development in emerging markets. The chapter will then proceed to 
document the disastrous impact of the Washington Consensus on sustainable development in
Sub-Saharan Africa in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The final section will
present the case of Ghana through which prospects for the sustainable development of Sub-
Saharan in the twenty-first century are considered. In this section, discussion will focus on the 
emergence of a new debt crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter will conclude that 
consideration of external factors is integral to our understanding of sustainable development in 
emerging markets. 
The 1980s Debt Crisis and the Washington Consensus of the IMF and World Bank
Based on classical liberal economic theory of Adam Smith and David Riccardo, the 1970s and 
1980s saw neoliberal critique of state-led approaches to the development of emerging markets
















   
 






involvement of the state in the economy led to inefficiency and slower economic growth. The 
route to both economic and social development, according to neoliberalism, was through 
markets, the price signals emanating from unencumbered economic exchange provide incentives
to entrepreneurs ensuring the efficient allocation of economic resources and social good. 
Consequently, neoliberal ideology focuses on the need for structural reform of national business 
environments to free markets, increase the competitiveness of domestic firms, and open the 
economy to global trade and capital. Whilst neoliberalism gained ascendancy in several 
advanced economies as a consequence of systematic capitalist crises of the 1970s, neoliberalism
was exported to emerging markets by the IMF and World Bank. Integral in the transmission of 
neoliberalism from the advanced economies to emerging markets was the debt crisis of the early 
1980s (Simon, 2008: 86-87), which led to a radical transformation in the international business
environment. 
The origin of the debt crisis lay in the 1960s and 1970s, which saw a steep rise in lending to
emerging markets to fund infrastructure projects. Whilst in the 1960s most lending was 
conducted with bilateral donors in North America and Europe, by the 1970s emerging markets
began to borrow from multinational banks. The lending by multinational banks was only possible 
due to the growth of the oil producing exporting countries, rising oil prices leading to large fiscal
surpluses in those Middle Eastern emerging markets, which were deposited multinational banks. 
The late 1970s, however, saw drastic falls in commodity prices in world trade. This was 
particularly dangerous for emerging markets whose government revenue largely consisted of the 
proceeds from commodity exports. As interest rates went up in the international business 
environment, emerging markets began to suffer from capital flight as investors withdrew capital












   
 
 
The debt crisis came to the fore in the international business environment with Brazil and 
Mexico’s announcement that they could no longer service their foreign debt in 1982. This 
triggered panic among creditor governments and multinational banks of the advanced economies. 
It was feared that, without strict countermeasures imposed upon debtor countries, crisis would 
spread throughout the international business environment that would drive banks to bankruptcy 
and lead to recession. Analysis by the IMF, echoed by creditor governments and multinational 
banks, placed the blame for the debt crisis on emerging markets, which were considered to be 
corrupt, bureaucratic and interventionist producing inefficient economies (Simon, 2008: 87). In 
response to the debt crisis, the IMF and World Bank made emergency funding to emerging 
markets conditional upon agreement of a structural adjustment programme (SAP) (Killing, 2008; 
Willis, 2005: 51-54). The debt crisis was thus the catalyst for a new era of market-based 
development for emerging markets founded on neoliberal economic policy (Milward, 2000), 
which became termed the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990; 2004). 
The neoliberal economic policy implemented through SAPs fell into two categories. Short-term
stabilisation measures were designed to arrest immediate economic problems. Policy in this 
category included public sector wage freezes, reduced subsidies on food, health, education and 
currency devaluation. Meanwhile, long-term adjustment measures were implemented to achieve 
structural reform of the national business environment. Policy in this category included 
liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and reduction of taxation. Meanwhile, the 
objectives of the SAPs were two-fold. The first objective was to improve economic efficiency 
through a reduction of the role of the state in economy, which would promote competitiveness in 


















generate foreign exchange reserves through economic diversification and commodity trade 
(Simon, 2008: 87-88).
The IMF and World Bank expected emerging markets to follow initial SAPs for three to four 
years. Once a SAP was completed, emerging markets then had to follow an economic recovery 
programme (ERP) of similar duration, which was designed to promote broader economic 
restructuring. SAPs and ERPs were later replaced by the introduction of poverty reduction 
strategies (PRSs). In contrast to previous SAPs and ERPs, and in response to vociferous criticism
by civil society groups and non-governmental organisations, PRSs had to prioritise antipoverty 
expenditure by government, supposedly agreed in consultation with civil society in the donor
country. In reality, however, consultation by the IMF and World Bank was often minimal and 
superficial (Simon, 2008: 90). The 1990s also saw the Washington Consensus broadened through
conditionality to promote ‘good governance’, which involved restructuring state institutions, 
such as the civil service and legal reform, to enhance democracy and ‘support market-led 
development’ (Jenkins, 2008: 516).
The evolution of the Washington Consensus in the latter part of the twentieth century has thus 
been described as ‘pragmatic neoliberalism’ on the part of the IMF and World Bank (Eyoh & 
Sandrook, 2003). The Washington Consensus did change after the 1980s to allow for a stronger
role for the state in the national business environment of emerging markets. Whilst this did differ 
from the original Washington Consensus, the IMF and World Bank still held a neoliberal
perspective on the route to development. The state was limited in the later version of Washington 
Consensus to intervention in the national business environment through the provision of 
education and health to improve competitiveness (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2003: 228-232). 



















‘market-based strategy’ designed to expose emerging markets and developing countries to global 
trade and capital (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2003: 229). 
The Impact of the Washington Consensus on the Sustainable Development of Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the Twentieth Century
Studies increasingly identified the disastrous economic and social impact of the Washington 
Consensus on emerging markets (Simon, 2008). The imposition of the Washington Consensus 
led to vast increases in income and wealth inequality (Chang & Gradel, 2004: 19-23) and 
degradation of the environment (Reed, 1992). Importantly, the Washington Consensus was 
demonstrated to be unsuccessful when judged against the economic objectives for its 
implementation. Indeed, economic growth in many emerging markets slowed after 1980 when 
compared with the three decades previous to 1950, which had seen emerging markets adopt 
Keynesian and state-led models of development (Chang & Gradel, 2004: Chp. 2). Neither did the 
Washington Consensus lead to social good through a significant reduction in poverty within the 
international business environment. Reduction in poverty from 1980-2000 can almost entirely be 
explained by the rise of China and India, two countries that did not develop according to the 
neoliberal development model advanced in the Washington Consensus (Chang & Gradel, 2004:
Chp. 4). At the close of the twentieth century, questions were being asked as to whether the
Washington Consensus could deliver development, never mind sustainable development. 
The IMF and World Bank were also accused of engaging in geopolitics through the Washington 
Consensus. The IMF and World Bank argued to be ‘kicking away the ladder’ from emerging 















to emerging markets the state-led development models through which the now advanced 
economies had reached their ascendant position in the international business environment 
(Chang, 2003).The conditional nature of the SAPs were a particular subject of criticism
highlighted as an invasion of the national sovereignty of emerging markets to determine their 
own economic policy (Bracking, 1999). Conditionality was presented as further evidence that the
IMF and World Bank were not disinterested guardians of the international business environment, 
but rather bipartisan actors acting in the economic interests of the advanced economies of North 
America and Europe. The imposition of neoliberalism through SAPs was criticised by African 
non-governmental organisations as no less than a form of re-colonization by the advanced 
economies, which allowed ‘the pillage of what remains of Africa’s economic wealth’ (Hoogvelt, 
2001: 181). 
The negative impact of the Washington Consensus on sustainable development was nowhere 
more evident than in Sub-Saharan Africa, making it a vital research subject. The 1980s saw 29 
Sub-Saharan African countries accept a SAP with the IMF and World Bank, which amounted to 
an almost continent-wide application of SAPs and ERPs after 1980 (Simon, 1995). Indeed, after
1980 ‘more countries in Sub-Saharan Africa’ than any other region of the international business
environment implemented SAPs and ERPs (Dixon, Simon & Narman, 1995: 2). The purpose of 
the Washington Consensus was ‘to shatter the dominant post-war state-led development 
paradigm’, which had driven growth in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-war period, and 
‘overcome the problems of development stagnation by promoting open and free competitive 
market economies, supervised by minimal states’ (Hoogvelt, 2001: 181). By the mid-1990s, Sub-
Saharan Africa was ‘the poorest continental region in the world’ (Dixon, Simon & Narman, 

















Consensus to Sub-Saharan Africa from 1980-2000 caused a ‘calamitous reversal of economic 
conditions’, which had seen the whole continent of Africa ‘become structurally irrelevant to the 
present global economic order’ (Hoogvelt, 2001: 175).
Quite the opposite from overcoming developmental stagnation, the Washington Consensus
accelerated the process of economic decline of Sub-Saharan Africa. Under previous post-war 
state-led developmental model gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew by 34% from
1960-1980. The corresponding two decades from 1980-2000 saw Sub-Saharan African GDP per 
capita fall by 15% (Chang & Gradel, 2004). Per capita income across Sub-Saharan Africa 
declined in the 1980s by an astonishing 30% alone. By the end of the millennium the average 
growth rate of the continent had not caught population growth. Meanwhile, debt burden in 
relation to gross domestic product had risen steeply to the highest for any emerging region and 
private investment into Sub-Saharan Africa remained weak (Hoogvelt, 2001: 181). The 
Washington Consensus also failed to achieve economic diversification within Sub-Saharan
Africa, which is shown by the declining performance of the region in international trade. By the 
1990s, Sub-Saharan African share of international trade in primary commodities collapsed to 
0.5% from the 7% it enjoyed in the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa 
trade in manufacturing goods fell from 1.2% in 1970 to 0.4% in the late 1990s. 1975-1990 also 
saw the regions share of agricultural and food exports in international markets fall from 21% to 
8%. Such was the overall collapse of international trade in the region that by 1997 Sub-Saharan 
Africa accounted for lower share of world exports than Belgium (Hoogvelt, 2001: 173; Eyoh &
Sandbrook, 2003: 237-242). 
Sub-Saharan Africa was not only excluded from international trade, but also from international 













Saharan Africa fell from 13% in the 1980s to 5% in the late 1990s. Foreign direct investment that 
did reach the region went to South Africa and Nigeria in the majority and was directed primarily 
at the extractive industries of mining and petroleum (Hoogvelt, 2001: 173-174). The Washington 
Consensus thus led Sub-Saharan Africa states to became ‘dependent’ on foreign aid as a source 
of inward investment, which accounted for virtually all expenditure on infrastructure and social 
projects in the 1980s and 1990s  (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2003: 237-242). 
Criticism of the impact of the Washington Consensus on Sub-Saharan Africa extends beyond 
economic indicators of sustainable development. SAPs were linked to increasing social 
instability in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jones, 1994; Narman, 1995). Indeed, such was the instability 
induced by the SAP agreed with Ghana in the mid-1980s, which required significant reduction in 
expenditure on health and education, the IMF had to implement palliative measures to ensure
Ghanaian society did not descend into anarchy (Simon, 2008). The implementation of SAPs also 
led to increasing food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pearce, 1994). Adequate supply of food 
was undermined by IMF insistence that food production switch to crops for export. For example, 
Zimbabwe was pressured into selling maize from the bumper harvest of 1991-1992, rather than 
ensure sustainable supply over forthcoming years. When the harvest failed two years later due to 
lack of rain, Zimbabwe was forced to import maize at a far highest cost than it had obtained 
selling its surplus in the global business environment (Simon, 2008). 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Sustainable Development  and the Debt Crisis of the Twenty-First 
Century: The Case of Ghana 
Sub-Saharan Africa thus entered the twenty-first century with declining growth of national 











sustainable development. The opening years of the new century, however, saw a new wave of 
optimism for the economic future of Sub-Saharan Africa such that the Economist (2000; 2013) 
magazine re-branded the continent from ‘hopeless’ to ‘hopeful’. The 2000s saw Sub-Saharan 
Africa expand into the second fastest growing region in the international business environment 
behind Asia with a growth rate of 5.7%. This was aided by economic reforms across Sub-
Saharan Africa, which has seen the cost of doing business across the whole continent fall by two-
thirds and time taken to start a business was more than halved since 2006. Importantly, these 
economic achievements translated into social development. Those living in poverty on the 
continent of Africa fell from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012. Meanwhile, life expectancy grew by 
six years from 1995 to 2012 (Woodward, 2016). Furthermore, optimism for the economic future 
of Sub-Saharan Africa is considered to arise from its favourable demographics, which is driving 
urbanization and growth of consumer markets (UN, 2017; 2017a). 
Despite this initial economic success, average economic growth across Sub-Saharan Africa has 
fallen progressively since mid-2010s to just 2.6% GDP in 2017 (IMF, 2017, p. ix). One of the 
many Sub-Saharan countries to be afflicted by recent economic difficulties has been Ghana. 
Previously lauded as a ‘model nation’ by the IMF and World Bank for the vigorous 
implementation of its SAP in the 1980s, liberalization of the Ghanaian economy and adjustment 
to multi-party democracy (Opoku-Dapaah, 2011), recent economic problems in Ghana has led to 
questions about the sustainability of its developmental model (Vergne, 2015). The cause of the 
recent economic downturn in Ghana is the fresh debt crisis in the international business 
environment. Reflecting a mirror image of the Sub-Saharan African experience during the 1980s, 
















   
 
 
debt crisis has the same causes and has once again led to involvement of the IMF and a new 
wave of SAPs throughout the continent. 
The first cause of the current debt crisis in the international business environment is the 
significant influx of lending that has flowed to some of the most impoverished nations around 
the world since the global financial crisis (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2015). This was nowhere
more apparent than Ghana. Significant cancellation of Ghanaian debt in 2005 made Ghana a 
more attractive proposition as a debtor in global financial markets. This led to increased lending 
to the country, gradually from 2008-2011, before increasingly rapidly from 2013-2015. Ghana 
was the recipient of significant direct lending from multinational banks, and other commercial
and private lenders, and multilateral donors like the IMF and World Bank. The Ghanaian 
government contributed to the influx of lending into the economy through the $1billion worth of 
Dollar denominated bonds it sold in financial markets prior to 2015 (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 
2016). The has meant a rise in Ghanaian external debt from 10% GDP in 2006 to 52.9% GDP in 
2016 (IMF, 2017a). 
The second cause of the debt crisis is continued dependence of Sub-Saharan Africa on
commodity exports. The SAP agreed between Ghana and the IMF in the 1980s, with its 
emphasis on the need to generate export-orientated growth, sought to achieve economic 
diversification and a rise in commodity exports. In order to achieve the latter objective the IMF 
and World Bank have championed the extractive industries as agents of export creation in
emerging markets. Following this advice, Ghanaian governments since the 1980s have promoted 
large-scale mining by Transnational corporations as a fundamental aspect of development 
strategy (Ayelazuno, 2014). However, this has hindered attempts to achieve economic 
diversification within the Ghanaian economy. The result has been a falling share of 
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manufacturing in the Ghanaian economy since the millennium, which has exacerbated Ghanaian 
dependence on commodity exports and left Ghana anchored near the bottom of global supply 
chains. Ghanaian government revenue is now dependent on three commodities, gold, oil and 
cocoa, which accounts for 80% of all exports. (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2016). Commodity 
dependence is a major source of economic vulnerability not only for Ghana, but the whole of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, exposing countries to volatile commodity prices as it was during the 1980s. 
Of the 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 are dependent on the export of only one
commodity for revenue, whilst three-quarters are dependent on the export of three commodities
(Woodward, 2016). Commodity dependence has meant Sub-Saharan economic growth has been 
a mirage, built upon the shaky foundation’s of a commodity boom in the international business
environment, which began in the mid-2000s and led to rising commodity prices in global trade
that inflated government revenue across the region. When the commodity boom ended in 2014
and prices of commodities fell, the dependence of Sub-Saharan African countries on commodity 
exports translated into declining government revenue. In turn, this made repayments of external 
debt harder to finance. Subsequent currency devaluation across Sub-Saharan Africa due to 
falling export incomes, including the Ghanaian Cedi, has only served to increase the size of 
external debt and made debt repayments more expensive (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2015; 2016). 
Chad, Gambia, Sudan and Zimbabwe have all defaulted on some of its external debt over the last 
couple of years (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2015, p. 5; 2016a: 1-3), Mozambique external debt is 
now considered ‘unpayable’ (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2016c) and Ethiopia, Sao Tome, Senegal, 













   
 
  




The debt crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa has led the IMF to once again administer its economic 
medicine to the continent. In April 2015, Ghana agreed funding with the IMF worth $930million, 
the only way Ghana could pay the interest on its external debt to private creditors in the 
international business environment (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2016). Meanwhile, subsequent 
investigation has found the integral role of the World Bank in creating the debt crisis in Ghana in 
the first place. World Bank rules state that a country classed as a medium-term debt risk should 
have at least 50% of lending provided in the form of grants. However, 93% of funding to Ghana 
from 2007-2015, when Ghana was classed as at medium debt risk, took the form of repayable 
loans. In October 2015, the World Bank guaranteed $400million payment on $1billion bond sold 
by Ghanaian government to private speculators in global financial markets despite Ghana now 
classed as a ‘high-risk’ by the World Bank, which should have been prohibited under its own 
rules (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2016b).
Funding from the IMF in April 2015 was conditional upon the acceptance of another SAP by 
Ghana, which mandated that government expenditure should be reduced to achieve a 2.9% GDP 
surplus in its primary balance, a 17.5% tax on petroleum introduced, subsidies on utilities and 
fuel eliminated and a net freeze on public sector employment introduced outside of health and 
education. Acting on IMF advice, real term government spending per person in Ghana has fallen 
by 20% per person by 2017 (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2016: 23-27). This echoes IMF (2017, Chp. 
2) advice to the wider Sub-Saharan region regarding the need to implement fiscal consolidation, 
entailing cuts to government expenditure and fiscal deficits, in order to reduce elevated public 
debt levels and achieve debt sustainability. 
The involvement of the IMF and World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1980s has been 













turbulence in the international business environment promised by the IMF designed SAP
implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa, four decades later the region has been plunged into another 
debt crisis. This contemporary debt crisis has not only been caused in part by loans offered by 
the IMF and World Bank, but also dependence on commodity exports to which IMF SAPs 
contributed. Sub-Saharan African economic growth in the twenty-first century has proved 
illusory and to add insult to injury has been unable to provide the resources for the current 
generation, never mind the next generation of its population, the definition of sustainable 
development. 302.7million of the Sub-Saharan African population live in extreme poverty of less 
than $1.90 per day, 170million of which are children (World Bank & Unicef, 2016). Meanwhile, 
23.2% of the Sub-Saharan African population are undernourished (United Nations Food & 
Agriculture Organization, 2015). Given that current IMF policy in Ghana and Sub-Saharan 
African represents continuation of the neoliberal market-based strategy of the Washington 
Consensus, which has delivered four decades of lost development and contributed to another 
debt crisis in the region, the people of Sub-Saharan African could be forgiven for despondency
regarding its prospects for sustainable development. 
Conclusion
This chapter has noted that absent from discussion of emerging markets is the external factors
that contribute to their potential for sustainable development. In particular, critical analysis of 
how the sustainable development of emerging markets is conditioned by the structure of the 
international business environment has been neglected. This chapter has addressed that absence 
through a case study of the impact of the IMF and World Bank on the sustainable development 
of Sub-Saharan Africa since 1980. Analysis of the IMF and World Bank is vital because the 






















business environment in the last four decades. The chapter has found that the IMF and World 
Bank have been a consistent barrier to the sustainable development of the region. The response 
of the IMF to the debt crisis of the early 1980s through SAPs delivered economic decline and 
social instability to Sub-Saharan Africa. When economic growth did arrive in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the twenty-first century, instead of evidence of global competitiveness and economic 
diversification as promised by the Washington Consensus, it was illusory and predicated on 
continued commodity dependence that IMF and World Bank advice and SAPs exacerbated. The
lost opportunity for the sustainable development of Sub-Saharan Africa under the constraints of 
the Washington Consensus is demonstrated by the resurgence of a new debt crisis nearly four 
decades after the last. In response, the IMF has introduced a new round of SAPs to the region, 
which suggests it has learnt nothing from experience over the last four decades. If we are to 
increase our understanding of the causes of sustainable development in emerging markets it is 
necessary to consider external factors in the international business environment. Analyses that 
exclude the impact of external actors are likely to imply overly-negative economic governance 
on the part of emerging-market actors. This serves to further their continued economic 
marginalization, whilst also failing to fully understand international power relations at play in 
attempts at sustainable development. 
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